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Abstract
One main topic of the epistemic program of game theory deals with the value of infor-
mation. To study this question in a broad context, one needs to adapt some of the tools
used in multiplayer epistemic logic. A hierarchical belief structure is introduced both in a
syntactical and a semantical framework. In the same framework, a generalized notion of mes-
sage is characterized by its content and its status. For a given message, a multiplayer belief
revision rule that transforms any initial belief structure into a nal belief one is designed. A
representation theorem relates syntactical axioms to the belief revision rule.
Journal of Economic Literature Classication Number: C72, D82
1 Introduction
The information value was rst introduced in decision theory by Blackwell (1951), then in game
theory by Hirshleifer (1971). Consider a player who is uncertain about the states of nature,
who receives a message which is correlated to the true state, who revises his beliefs according to
the message and who chooses an (equilibrium) action according to his beliefs. The di¤erential
(average) utility he gets after receiving the message and before receiving the message is precisely
called its information value.
The information value is always positive in decision theory under uncertainty, at least when
the decision-maker maximizes his expected utility and receives a partitional message. Under
the two last conditions, it may be negative in game theory for any player as shown in many
examples (Hirschlei¤er, 1971; Kamien-Taumann-Zamir, 1990). However, in three di¤erent game
cases, the information value is positive for the receiver of : (i) a secret message (Neyman, 1991);
(ii) a private message in a zero-sum game (Gossner, 2001); (iii) a public message in a pure
coordination game.
In this literature, the models are highly restricted. Firstly, while initial and nal beliefs
are exogeneously and explicitly given, the message linking both remains implicit and informal.
Secondly, when one compares belief structures thanks to an accuracy order, this order is speci-
cally designed for dealing with each type of message. Thirdly, the framework that is used is just
semantical, without syntactical counterpart, and it is moreover limited to the partitional case.
billot@u-paris2.fr
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zwalliser@mail.enpc.fr
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In order to overpass these limitations, the problem has to be more precisely analyzed in
epistemic logics. Firstly, the message must be isolated and formally dened in terms of content
(material, epistemic) and status (public, private, secret). Secondly, an accuracy order expressing
that a belief structure is more informative than another must be set up by means of general
conditions. Thirdly, the belief revision rule has to be given in syntax and in semantics and
should also apply to non-partitional cases.
The present paper focuses on the logical foundations of the belief revision rule for hierarchical
belief structures. All assumptions and results are given in syntax (using belief operators on
propositions) and in semantics (using general accessibility relations on possible worlds). The
belief revision rule is designed in order to infer a nal belief from any initial belief and any
message. Note that two subsequent papers will further introduce accuracy orders and investigate
the question of the value of information.
In this paper, Section 2 presents a motivating example based on Madame Bovary story and
followed all along. In Section 3, the syntactical and semantical denitions of a hierarchical belief
structure are recalled. In Section 4, a message is dened within the same formal belief structure
but interpreted in a di¤erent way. In syntax, the content of a message is some proposition of the
belief language that is conveyed to each player and its status is described through propositions
in a learning language which expresses who learns the content of the message and its di¤usion.
Then some specic types of message are stated in syntax and described formally in semantics. In
Section 5, axioms are provided for multiplayer belief revision. The Belief Inference axiom states
that a proposition is nally believed by a player if and only if this player gets some message
and initially believes that the message involves the proposition. A symmetric Message Inference
axiom is also stated, but the two axioms have to be slightly generalized in order to get the
representation theorem. Actually, the corresponding semantical belief revision rule is exhibited
as a cross product of the initial belief and the message leading to the nal belief. In Section 6,
the related works areA examined.
2 Motivating Example
The literature is full of psychological situations in which characters have crossed beliefs one
about another. All along the novels, messages are sent and received which lead to revise beliefs.
For instance, in the famous French novel Madame Bovary (1856), Gustave Flaubert sets up
his scenario around Emmas adultery. Since an adultery is not a public event in the French
society of the XIXth century, crossed beliefs are quite natural, especially those of Emma and her
husband Charles. Let us imagine the following Flaubert style example.
Just after Emmas rst love a¤air with Rodolphe, the initial beliefs are the following. At the
rst level, Emma knows that she is unfaithful and her husband does not know but he has some
doubts. At the second level, Emma believes either that Charles knows she is unfaithful or that
Charles does not know and Charles obviously knows that his wife knows the truth, whatever it
is. At the third level, Emma thinks that Charles thinks that she knows the truth and Charles
thinks that Emma thinks that he believes she is faithful.
Suppose now that a message occurs... Charles learns the truth from Félicité, the homemaid.
Suppose moreover that Emma, being hidden behind the door, hears Félicité at the very moment
she speaks to Charles. Note that the message received by Charles is a rst level one since it
deals with the material situation, namely the fact that Emma is adultery. Moreover Charles
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thinks that the message he received is secret because he meets Félicité alone. Of course Emma
knows its content which then becomes shared. In return, the message received by Emma is a
second level one since it deals with Charlesbeliefs. Moreover, it is secret since Charles is not
aware that his wife is behind the door.
Such a story does not lead to an immediate belief revision. Actually, the intuition works
with di¢ culty (try yourself!) even though it follows the natural language and then is syntactical.
Furthermore, there exists no revision method in the literature that is able to deal with such a
situation characterized by the following features: beliefs and messages are syntactical; messages
induce a simultaneous revision of all players beliefs; the content of messages is material or
epistemic; the status of messages is of any kind, especially secret; erroneous beliefs must be
taken into account.
For clarity, the Bovary example will be formally treated all along the paper. The nal belief
will rst be computed in a semantical framework then translated in syntax. The results are the
following. At the two rst levels, Emma and Charles know and know that the other knows the
truth. At the third level, Emma knows that Charles knows that she knows the thruth. But
Charles still believes that Emma believes that he believes she is faithful. Finally, at the fourth
level, Emma knows that Charles knows that Emma believes either that Charles knows the truth
or that Charles doubts while Charles believes that Emma believes that he believes that she
believes she is faithful.
3 Initial Belief
3.1 Syntax
Let I be a nite set of players i. Amultiplayer language is dened according to three components:
(i) primitive propositions typically labeled p, q... that describe the common physical envi-
ronment faced by the players and form a nite nonempty set P,
(ii) propositional connectors, i.e. negation :, conjunction ^ , material implication !, dis-
junction _,
(iii) epistemic operators, denoted (Bi)i2I , that describe players beliefs about physical envi-
ronment and about other players beliefs.
The multiplayer language L is a set of well-formed formulas typically labeled ' or  ... which
is induced by three requirements:8<:
if p 2 P, then p 2 L,
if '; 2 L, then :', : ;' ^  ;'!  ;' _  2 L,
if ' 2 L, then 8i 2 I, Bi' 2 L.
(1)
Especially, L0  L is the subset of all propositions without belief operator.
A SYntactic Structure (SYS) combines two classes of propositions: the tautological ones and
the contingent ones.
First, consider the subset T  L of propositions that are necessarily true. They are obtained
by three axioms and two inference rules.1
A1: All tautologies of propositional calculus.
1The propositions ' 2 T are provable and sometimes denoted ` ' in the literature.
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A2 (Logical Omniscience): Bi' ^Bi ('!  )! Bi .
A3 (Weak Consistency): :Bi?.
R1 (Modus Ponens): From ' and '!  , infer  .
R2 (Necessitation Rule): From ', infer Bi'.
Second, for a subset C of L, let us dene two constraints:
C1 (No Contradiction): If ' 2 C, then :' =2 C.
C2 (Completeness): If ' =2 C, then :' 2 C.
The universe is described through a subset of propositions.
Denition 1 : A SYntactic Structure (SYS) is a subset K of L which satises R1, C1 and
C2, with T  K.
Note that we do not assume the usual axioms for epistemic operators, that is Veridicity (or
Truth), Positive and Negative Introspection.
Bovary Example: In order to describe the Bovary belief-language, we need two operators, BE
(Emma believes...) and BC (Charles believes...). The only primitive proposition is denoted
p (Emma is unfaithful). The SYS KBovary contains the following contingent propositions
at the three rst levels:
physical environment
0-level p
Emmas beliefs
1-level BEp
2-level BE:BC:p, :BEBCp, :BE:BCp
3-level BE (BCBEp _ ((BC (BEp _BE:p) ^ :BCBEp ^ :BCBE:p))
Charlesbeliefs
1-level :BCp, :BC:p
2-level :BCBEp, :BCBE:p, BC ((p! BEp) ^ (:p! BE:p))
3-level BCBEBC:p
3.2 Semantics
To represent the actual universe in semantics, we consider the Kripke model composed of possible
worlds and accessibility relations between them. More precisely, we dene a SEmantic Structure
(SES)2 by a list of its components plus a condition of Connectedness:
2 In epistemic logics, a SES corresponds to a connected pointed belief model.
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Denition 2 : A SEmantic Structure (SES) for a set I of players is dened as a 5-uple H =
(W; (Hi)i2I ; S;H0;w) where:
(i) W is a set of mutually exclusive possible worlds denoted w,
(ii) Hi is an accessibility relation from W toward 2W n;,
(iii) S is a set of mutually exclusive states of nature s,
(iv) H0 is the accessibility relation of nature dened from W toward S,
(v) w is the actual world
such that:
(Connectedness) In the actual world w, for each world w, there exists a nite sequence of
players i1; :::; in and a nite sequence of worlds w0; :::; wn such that w0 = w, wn = w and for
all n  k  1, wk 2 Hik (wk 1).
A (possible) world is a full description of the physical environment and of the players beliefs
about it. The physical part called nature is represented by a state of nature. The psychical part
representing the beliefs of the players about the physical world are embodied in the accessibibility
relations. They gather the worlds which are considered undiscernable by a given player in a given
world. Connectedness means that the set of possible worlds does not include inaccessible worlds
from the actual one.
Bovary Example: In order to describe the Bovary semantical structure, we just introduce two
states of nature, p (Emma is unfaithful) and :p (Emma is faithful). The SES HBovary
corresponds to the following graph.3 (Figure1(structureinitiale).pdf)
3.3 Transcription principles
The transcription principles link syntax and semantics. Consider a SES H and dene an inter-
pretation function  as a mapping which associates to each state s 2 S a truth assignment of
the primitive propositions, i.e.  (s) : p 2 P ! ftrue; falseg.4 The truth value of a formula
' in some particular world w is written: (H; w) j= ', which means that ' is true in world w
within the SES H. Let j'j be the eld of the formula ', i.e. the set of worlds where ' is true.
The following valuation rules express the truth assignment for any formula:8>>>><>>>>:
(H; w) j= p i¤  H0 (w) (p) = true,
(H; w) j= :' i¤ (H; w) 2 ',
(H; w) j= ' ^  i¤ (H; w) j= ' and (H; w) j=  ,
(H; w) j= Bi' i¤ (H; w0) j= ' for all w0 such that w0 2 Hi (w) ,
i.e. (H; w) j= Bi' i¤Hi (w)  j'j .
(2)
A SYS K is associated with a SES H by the following bridge principle:
' 2 K i¤ (H;w) j= '. (3)
3The actual world w = w0 is represented by a square and the other worlds (w1; :::; w7) by a circle. All of
them are numbered as indexes. Besides, the state of each world appears inside. Emmas accessibility relation is
represented by a full line while Charlesis a doted line.
4The usual valuation function v is a composition of the accessibility relation of the nature H0 with the in-
terpretation function : it associates, for each world, a truth assignment of the primitive propositions: v(w) =
(H0(w)).
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The SYS K corresponds to all formulas which are true in the actual world w. The Kripke
representation theorem asserts that it is always possible to associate a set of SESs H all of
them being bisimilar5 to a SYS K (van Benthem, 2000).
Bovary Example: For instance, let us check if (HBovary;w) j= BCBEBC:p. First, note
that, on Figure 1, j:pj = fw5; w6; w7g. Then, jBC:pj = fw1; w4; w5; w7g, jBEBC:pj =
fw3; w4; w6g. Finally, jBCBEBC:pj = fw0 = w; w3; w4; w6g.
5Two SESs are said to be bisimilar when they reect the same syntactical propositions. Formal conditions for
bisimilarity will be given in a subsequent paper.
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4 Message
4.1 Syntax
Informally, a message is dened by two components. Its content, which describes the information
received by each player (eventually di¤erent from one player to another), and its status, which
describes what the players know about the di¤usion of the information among players. Formally,
from the point of view of the modeler, a message can be represented by a SYS in an auxiliary
language (or a message language) denoted L. It is formed of three components:
(i) the set of primitive propositions,M = fm0; :::;ml; :::;mLg, which is such that:
(i-a) for all l, ml 2 L,
(i-b) for all l 6= l0, ml ^ml0 =? and
(i-c) m0 _m1 _ ::: _mL = >,6
(ii) the usual propositional connectors,
(iii) the epistemic operators denoted
 
Bi

i2I . that describe players learning about the mes-
sage and about what the other players learn.
Denition 3 : A message structure is a SYS K dened on the language L.
More precisely, the content of a message received by an agent is a formula m in L, however
restricted to L0. It is obtained as a combination of primitive messages ml which jointly express
the maximal degree of resolution of the message. The status of the message is given by all
formulas containing at least one epistemic operator, contained in LnL0. For instance, the formula
BiBjm expresses that player i learns that player j learns the content m.
Bovary Example: The syntactical structure of the message KBovary carried by Félicité is based
on the following three rst levels. The message m0 stands for p and m1 for :p:
physical environment
0-level m0 = p
Emmas beliefs
1-level BEm0
2-level BEBCm0
3-level BEBC
 :BEm0 ^ :BEm1
Charlesbeliefs
1-level BCm0
2-level BC
 :BEm0 ^ :BEm1
3-level BCBE
 :BCm0 ^ :BCm1
6This condition on the set of primitive propositions for the auxiliary language L seems more demanding than
the corresponding condition for the set of primitive propositions for the language L. It is not true. Indeed, the set
of primitive propositions is arbitrary and it is always possible to use a set which satises conditions (i-a) and (i-b).
We introduce these conditions because the description of the content of a message is denitely more intuitive.
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4.2 Semantics
The SYS K has a semantical counterpart given by a SES H = (W;  H ii2I ; S;H0;w). The set
of states of nature S = fs0; :::; sl; :::; sLg is such that the interpretation function  is dened as
 (sl) [ml] = true, while  (sl) [ml0 ] = false, for l 6= l0. Hence, each state of nature corresponds
to a primitive proposition inM. For a syntactical content m in L and L0, denoteM = jmj W
its semantical content in the initial SES andM = jmj W its semantical content in the auxiliary
SES H.
Bovary Example: The semantical structure of the message is given by the following graph:
(Figure2(message).pdf)
4.3 Types of Message
Four di¤erent standard types of message are usually considered, according to their di¤erent
status. They are informally dened in syntax and formally dened in semantics.
 In a public message, it is commonly learned that each player receives the content m0:
Denition 4 : A public message is dened by the SES Hpub where
W = fwg ; w 2M0,
8i 2 I, H i (w) = fwg .
 In a private message, one player receives a message of content m0 while other players
receive nothing, and this is commonly learned.
Denition 5 : A private message for i is dened by the SES Hpri where8<:
W = fw; w1; :::; wl; :::; wLg ; w 2M0; 8l 6= 0, wl 2M l,
H i (w) = fwg ; 8l 6= 0, H i (wl) = fwlg and,
8j 6= i, 8l 6= 0, Hj (w) = Hj (wl) = fw; w1; :::; wLg .
 In a secret message, one player receives a message of content m0, the other players learn
that nothing was learned and the rst player learns it:
Denition 6 : A secret message for i is dened by the SES Hsec where8<:
W = fw; w0; w1; :::; wLg ; w; w0 2M0; 8l 6= 0, wl 2M l,
H i (w) = fwg ; 8l 6= 0, H i (w0) = H i (wl) = fw0; w1; :::; wLg and,
8j 6= i, 8l 6= 0, Hj (w) = Hj (w0) = Hj (wl) = fw0; w1; :::; wLg .
 In a null message, it is commonly learned that nobody learns any content:
Denition 7 : A null message is dened by the SES Hnul where
W = fw; w1; :::; wNg ; w 2M0; 8l 6= 0, wl 2M l,
8i 2 I;8l 6= 0; H i (w) = H i (wl) = fw; w1; :::; wLg .
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But all possible types of message are not described within these four basic types. Other
types can be proposed:
 In a quasi-secret message, one player learns a message of content m0 but other players
ignore if he has learned it or not.
Denition 8 : A quasi-secret message for i is dened by the SES Hq sec where8<:
W = fw; w1; :::; wL; w00; w01; :::; w0Lg ; w; w00 2M0; 8l 6= 0, wl; w0l 2M l,
H i (w) = fwg ; 8l 6= 0, H i (wl) = fwlg ; 8l 6= 0, H i (w00) = H i (w0l) = fw00; w01; :::; w0Lg and,
8j 6= i;8l 6= 0; Hj (w) = Hj (w00) = Hj (wl) = Hj (w0l) = fw; w1; :::; wL; w00; w01; :::; w0Lg .
 In a Bcc message,7 two players i; j learn a message of content m0 but i is the only player
to learn who receives it and this is commonly learned.
Denition 9 : A Bcc message for i is dened by the SES HBcc where8<:
W = fw; w1; :::; wL; w00; w01; :::; w0Lg ; w; w00 2M0; 8l 6= 0, wl; w0l 2M l,
H i (w) = fwg ; 8l 6= 0, H i (wl) = fwlg ; 8l 6= 0, H i (w00) = H i (w0l) = fw00; w01; :::; w0Lg and,
8j 6= i, Hj (w) = Hj (w00) = fw; w00g ; 8l 6= 0, Hj (wl) = Hj (w0l) = fwl; w0lg .
 In a private message believed public, only one player learns a message of content m0 but
he learns wrongly that other players also learn it.
Denition 10 : A private message believed public for i is dened by the SES Hppr where8<:
W = fw; w1; :::; wL; w00; w01; :::; w0Lg ; w; w00 2M0; 8l 6= 0, wl; w0l 2M l,
H i(w) = H i (w
0
0) = fw00g ; 8l 6= 0, H i (wl) = H i (w0l) = fw0lg and,
8j 6= i, 8l 6= 0, Hj (w) = Hj (wl) = fw; w1; :::; wLg ; Hj (w00) = fw00g ; 8l 6= 0, Hj (w0l) = fw0lg .
Bovary Example: From the point of view of Charles, the message concerning the physical
environment (Emma is unfaithful) is secret while actually the content of the message is
shared. From the point of view of Emma, the message concerning the message received by
Charles is secret and actually, it is!8
7Bccmeans Blind Carbon Copyin electronic mail language.
8 In the o¤spring paper which will dene accuracy orders, these intuitions will be precisely characterized.
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5 Multiplayer Belief Revision
5.1 Syntactic Foundations
Denote L the language in which the nal belief is expressed. L is dened according to:
(i) the primitive propositions P which are the same in L than in L,
(ii) the epistemic operators which are denoted Bi .
Denote L =
 L;L;L the language which extends L [ L [ L:
if '; 2 L, then :', : and (' ^  ) 2 L,
if ' 2 L, then 8i 2 I, Bi' 2 L.
(4)
This language allows simultaneously to deal with propositions belonging to the initial belief,
to the message and to the nal belief as well as with propositions of the nal belief over initial
belief or message.
We dene a Multioperator SYS (denoted MSYS ) by extension of a SYS. We consider rst
a subset T  L of tautological propositions that are obtained by axioms A1-A3 (for the three
operators Bi, Bi, Bi ) and inference rules R1 and R2 [from ' 2 L (resp. L (resp. L)), infer
Bi' (resp. Bi' (resp. Bi'))]. Then we consider a subset C  L of contingent propositions,
with T  K, that are true in the actual universe and which are submitted to Modus Ponens R1,
No Contradiction C1 and Completeness C2 (cf. §3.1). The MSYS is a subset K of L which
satises R1, C1 and C2 and contains T [ C.
The interpretation of the MSYS K is the following: K\L is a SYS in L interpreted as the
initial belief K, K\L is a SYS in L interpreted as the message K and K\L is a SYS in L which
will be interpreted as the nal belief K.
In order to characterize the revision process, we impose two following axioms to the MSYS
K:
A4 (No Conict): Bim! :Bi:m.
No Conict means that the message does not contradict the initial belief.
A5 (Belief and Message Inference): For any ' in K\L and any  in K\L,
^ml2M(Bi:ml _Bi:ml _Bi (ml  ! ') _Bi (ml  !  )) ! Bi (' _  ) .
This intricate axiom has meaningful consequences. Consider that  is a tautology, hence,
^ml2M(Bi:ml _Bi:ml _ (Bi (ml  ! ')) ! Bi (') .
Consider moreover that the message the player i learns is the basic message ms. It follows
that Bims and, by No Conict, :Bi:ms: For l 6= s, the terms in the conjonction are tautologies
(since Bi:ml is true) and for l = s, the term reduces to Bi (ms  ! ') (since Bi:ms _Bi:ms
is a contradiction). It follows that:
Bims ^Bi (ms  ! ')! Bi'.
It is easy to prove that the same relation applies to any message m.
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The same operation can be done by exchanging initial belief and message. Hence, the Belief
and Message Inference axiom entails the two following consequences.
_m2L0Bim ^Bi (m  ! ')! Bi'. (A5a (Belief Inference))
Belief Inference describes precisely the belief revision process as some kind of Modus Ponens: A
proposition is nally believed i¤ the player accepts some message and believes initially that this
message entails the proposition.
_m2L0
 
Bim ^Bi (m  !  )
! Bi . (A5b (Message Inference))
Message Inference means that a proposition is nally believed i¤ the player who already knows
some message learns that this message entails that proposition. Note that, whenm is a tautology,
this axiom moreover entails that any proposition initially believed and any proposition which is
learnt is nally believed.
These axioms are considered common belief according to belief operators Bi .
The following theorem ensures the unicity of the MSYS K stemmed from the SYSs K and
K and the axioms.
Theorem 1 : Consider two MSYSs K =
 K;K;K and K0=K0;K0;K0 satisfying No Con-
ict A4 and Belief and Message Inference A5. If K = K0 and K = K0 then K = K0.
Proof is in Appendix A.
Observe that there exists a unique nal belief K associated to K.
Bovary Example: At this step, we just give an example of the way the conditions work. Lets
prove that BEB

CB

Ep holds. By Belief Inference A5a,
 
BCm0 ^BC (m0  ! BEp)
  !
BCBEp. Since A5a is common belief, B

E
  
BCm0 ^BC (m0  ! BEp)
  ! BCBEp.
By Message Inference A5b with tautology as message, BEBCm0  ! BEBCm0 and
since by hypothesis BEBCm0 holds, then BEBCm0 is also true. By A5a with tautol-
ogy as message, BEBC (m0  ! BEp)  ! BEBC (m0  ! BEp) and since by hypothesis
BEBC (m0  ! BEp) holds, then BEBC (m0  ! BEp) is also true. Therefore by Modus
Ponens R1, BEB

CBEp. Finally, once more by A5a , B

EB

C (BEp  ! BEp), and by R1,
we get the result.
5.2 Semantic Rule
Let us combine an initial SES
H = (W; (Hi)i2I ; S;H0;w)
and an auxiliary SES
H = (W;  H ii2I ; S;H0;w)
in order to get a nal product structure denoted H:
H = H H =  W ; (Hi )i2I ; S;H0 ;w .
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Denition 11 (Product Structure) : From an initial belief SES H and a message SES H,
the product structure H is generated as follows:
Step 1: Dene fH = fW ; (Hi )i2I ; S;H0 ;w such that
(i) fW  =W W ,
(ii) 8 (w;w) 2 fW , 8i 2 I, Hi (w;w) = Sl=0;1;::;L  (Hi (w) \Ml)  H i (w) \M l,
(iii) S = S,
(iv) 8 (w;w) 2 fW , H0 (w;w) = H0 (w),
(v) w = (w;w).
Step 2: H is the connected part of fH.
In the product structure, each nal world is obtained as a Cartesian product of an initial
world and a message world. For any nal world, its accessibility domain proceeds from the
elimination of all initial and message worlds which contradict the same basic message. The set
of states of nature remains. The state of nature associated to each initial world is kept in the
corresponding nal world. The nal actual world is just a combination of the initial and message
actual worlds.
One can observe that H is a SES as soon as the accessibility relations Hi (w;w) are non
empty.
5.3 Representation Theorem
The following representation theorem can be proved:
Theorem 2 : Consider two SESs H and H and let the SYSs K and K be their syntactical
counterpart.
(1) If H = H  H is a SES, then there exists a MSYS K =  K;K;K which satises No
Conict A4 and Belief and Message Inference A5 and such that K is the syntactical counterpart
of H.
(2) If there exists a MSYS K =
 K;K;K which satises No Conict A4 and Belief and
Message Inference A5, then H = H H is a SES and is a semantical counterpart of K.
Proof is in Appendix B.
Bovary Example: We apply the product structure operation as follows. We consider all cou-
ples of worlds obtained by combining a world of the initial belief and a world of the message.
We rst dene the accessibility relations stemming from the actual nal world. We then
do the same from the worlds which were accessible from the actual world. We proceed
sequentially until no new world can be reached. The result is the nal belief structure
given in (Figure3(intermedstructurenale).pdf). This last structure can be simplied as
follows. The worlds w10 and w20 are equivalent to w1 and w2 (they have same accessibility
domains). Hence, this graph is bisimilar to a simplied one9 where the equivalent worlds
gather. This simplied graph is given in (Figure4(simplstructurenale).pdf). We can de-
duce from the previous graph the syntactical belief composed of the following propositions
at the rst four levels.
9Bisimilarity will be dene precisely in the o¤spring paper on accuracy orders.
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6 Related works
6.1 Signals
In the signaling literature (Blackwell, 1951), messages are introduced thanks to signals. More
precisely, consider a set of signals Y =
Q
i2I Yi. The set Y is nite and Y =

y0; y1; :::; yl; :::; yL
	
.
A signal function  :W ! Y associates y to each world w where the i-component i (w) denotes
the signal received by player i. The most usual types of signals are dened as follows. A public
signal can be written as: 8i; j, 8w, i (w) = j (w). A private signal for player i can be written
as: 8j 6= i, 8w;w0, j (w) = j (w0).
A revision rule is likely proposed. For each message y; it associates a nal accessibility
domain Hyi (w) to the initial accessibility domain Hi (w) by the following rule:
Hyi (w) = Hi (w) \  1i [i (w)] .
In order to compare this framework with ours, the following transposition is proposed. It
associates a message SES to each signal Y as follows:
(i) Ml =  1
 
yl

,
(ii) S = fs0; s1; :::; sLg,
(iii) W = fw0; w1; :::; wLg,
(iv) 8wl, H0 (wl) = sl,
(v) 8i, 8wl, Hi (wl) =

wl0 : 
 1
i
 
yl
0
i

=  1i (y
l
i)
	
.
The two types of messages (public, private) coincide with this transcription principle. More-
over, the belief revision rule is the same.
For a public message, Hyi (w) = Hi (w) \  1i [y]. In our framework, since W = fwg, this
can be rewritten as: Hi (w;w) = fHi (w) \Mg  fwg. There obviously exists an isomorphism
between W W and W . By using this isomorphism, Hi (w;w) =def Hi (w) = Hi (w) \M .
Since M is the subset of worlds where the message is true, Hi (w) = H
y
i (w).
For a private message for player i, Hyi (w) = Hi (w)\ 1i [i (w)] and Hyj (w) = Hj (w)\W =
Hj (w). In our framework, Hi (w;w) = fHi (w) \Mgfwg andHj (w;w) = fHj (w) \MgW .
By using connectedness, the only worlds to remain are the worlds (w; wk). There obviously
exists an isomorphism between fwg W and W . By using this isomorphism, Hi (w;w) =def
Hi (w) = Hi (w) \M and Hj (w;w) =def Hj (w) = Hj (w). Hence, Hi (w) = Hyi (w) and
Hj (w) = H
y
j (w).
However, some of the messages that can be dened in our framework have no counterpart
in terms of signal. This is obviously the case of messages involving errors like a secret one. It is
true as well for messages involving no errors like a quasi-secret or a Bcc one. This shows that
our framework is more general than the usual one.
6.2 Epistemic belief revision rules
The main attempt to design a belief revision rule in epistemic logics is due to Alchourron-
Gärdenfors-Makinson (1985) and is called the AGM system. It concerns only a single agent, but
is adapted to the case where the message contradicts the initial belief. In syntax, AGM propose
eight axioms concerning the transformation of the initial set of propositions into a revised one.
In semantics, the nal worlds are obtained by considering the worlds in the message which
are the nearest from those of the initial belief. In syntax, it means that, whence a message is
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added to the initial propositions, the less entrenched propositions (according to some epistemic
entrenchment order) are deleted until restauring the consistency of the system. Note that the
epistemic operators are not specically introduced.
Bonanno (2005) still considers one player but he is endowed with three syntactical operators:
B (initial belief), B (message) and B (nal belief). Besides, he restricts semantics to a unique
world space which may be simultaneously interpreted as W  W and W , the accessibility
relation being respectively H, H and H: His belief axioms are similar to ours.
Board (2004) considers several players i with an innity of syntactical operators Bmi where
m is any message that may contradict the initial belief. He also restricts semantics to a unique
world space and sets up an entrenchment order over that space. Note that his informational
axiom is similar to our two inference axioms, A5a and A5b. Besides, his success axiom, which
expresses that Bim  ! Bim, can be deduced from Belief Inference A5a and Non-Conict A4.
Baltag and alii (1998) whose approach is very close to ours, consider several players i who
may receive any message of any kind. The proposed syntax expresses the players belief after
receiving a message in a dynamic logics framework. Their action knowledge axiom is similar
to our inference axioms, A5a and A5b, but it needs to be written as a precondition on the
message. Since we consider the subclass of messages which can be viewed as an auxiliary belief
structure, the Baltags precondition becomes explicit. The semantic belief revision rule becomes
directly operational.
Aucher (2008) proposes a multi-agent belief revision theory, but it is restricted to the case
of a secret message (which he calls private). In that case, the othersbeliefs being unchanged,
he can apply the AGM framework, even when the message contradicts the initial belief.
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9 Appendix A
Theorem 1 : Consider two MSYSs K =
 K;K;K and K0=K0;K0;K0 satisfying No Con-
ict A4 and Belief and Message Inference A5. If K = K0 and K = K0 then K = K0.
Proof. : Dene the depth of a formula ' in L, denoted d('), as the number of modal
operators Bi (and not Bi) that are hierarchically used. It is dened recursively by d(') = 0
if ' 2 L [ L, d(:') = d('), d(' ^  ) = max(d('); d( )) and d(Bi') = d(') + 1. We
are going to prove that K = K0. We proceed by induction on the depth of proposition in
L. Let L be the set of propositions of L whose depth is inferior or equal to . Consider
rst propositions of depth 0. Note that L0 is the closure of L [ L with respect to the
propositionnal connectors. Remark that K \  L [ L = K [ K = K0 [ K0 = K0 \  L [ L.
Since K and K0 satisfy R1, K \ L0 = K0 \ L0. Consider now L1 and propositions of the
form Bi (' _  ) where ' 2 L and  2 L. By A5, Bi (' _  ) is equivalent to a proposition
of L0, it follows that Bi (' _  ) 2 K i¤Bi (' _  ) 2 K0. Therefore K \ L1 = K0 \ L1.
Suppose that K \ L = K0 \ L, for   1. Consider a proposition ' of depth  + 1:
it contains a set f 1;  2:::g of well-formed formulas of depth 1 that begins with a modal
operator Bi . By A5, each  i is equivalent to a proposition  
0
i of L0. If in the proposition
', we replace all the  i by the  
0
i, we obtain a proposition '
0 of depth . By A5 and A2,
' 2 K i¤ '0 2 K as well as ' 2 K0 i¤ '0 2 K0. Since '0 2 K i¤ '0 2 K0, ' 2 K i¤ ' 2 K0
and thus K \ L+1 = K0 \ L+1.
10 Appendix B
Theorem 2 : Consider two SESs H and H and let the SYSs K and K be their syntactical
counterpart.
(1) If H = H  H is a SES, then there exists a MSYS K =  K;K;K which satises
No Conict A4 and Belief and Message Inference A5 and such that K is the syntactical
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counterpart of H.
(2) If there exists a MSYS K =
 K;K;K which satises No Conict A4 and Belief and
Message Inference A5, then H = H H is a SES and is a semantical counterpart of K.
Proof. : (1) Let dene the semantic structure H as follows:
H =

W;W;W ; (Hi)i2I ;
 
Hi

i2I ; (H

i )i2I ; S; S; S
;H0; H0;H0 ;w


with
(i) Hi is an extended accessibility relation from W [W  toward 2W n;, with Hi (w;w) =
Hi (w),
(ii) Hi is an extended accessibility relation from W [W  toward 2W n;, with Hi (w;w) =
Hi (w),
(iii)H0 is an extended accessibility relation of nature fromW[W  toward S, withH0 (w;w) =
H0 (w).
The truth value of a formula ' in some particular world (w;w) is written: (H; (w;w)) j= ',
which means that ' is true in (w;w) within the structure H. The following valuation rules
express the truth assignment in W  for any formula:8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
(H; (w;w)) j= p i¤ (H; (w;w)) j= p,
(H; (w;w)) j= :' i¤ (H; (w;w)) 2 ',
(H; (w;w)) j= ' ^  i¤ (H; (w;w)) j= ' and (H; (w;w)) j=  ,8>><>>:
for ' 2 L, (H; (w;w)) j= Bi'
i¤ (H; (w0; w0)) j= ' for all (w0; w0) s.t. (w0; w0) 2 Hi (w;w) ,
for ' 2 L, (H; (w;w)) j= ' i¤ (H; w) j= ',
for ' 2 L, (H; (w;w)) j= ' i¤  H; w j= '.
We denote j'j the set f(w;w) 2W  s.t. (H; (w;w)) j= 'g, j'j the set fw 2W s.t. (H; w) j= 'g
and j'j the setw 2W s.t.  H; w j= '	. LetK be the syntactical counterpart ofH: K = f' 2 L s.t. (H; (w;w)) j= 'g.
Step 1: We show that, if H is a SES, then K is a MSYS. Remark that T =T [T [T .
Hence, T  K. It is obvious from the validation rules that K satises C1, C2 and R1.
Step 2: We show now that, if H is a SES, K satises A4: ^m2L0
 
Bim! :Bi:m

.
Consider any m 2 L0. There exists an index subset L0  L such that m is equivalent
to _l2L0ml. Consider any (w;w) 2 W  and any player i 2 I. We have that Hi (w;w) 6= ;.
Suppose rst that (H; (w;w)) j= Bim, that is H i (w) 
S
l2L0M l. Then H

i (w;w) 6= ; implies
that Hi (w) \
S
l2L0Ml 6= ; and hence, (H; (w;w)) j= :Bi:m. Therefore, (H; (w;w)) j= Bim!
:Bi:m. Now, if (H; (w;w)) 2 Bim, then necessarily (H; (w;w)) j= Bim ! :Bi:m. Since it
is true for all m 2 L0, the validation rules imply that (H; (w;w)) j= ^m2L0
 
Bim! :Bi:m

.
Since A4 holds in any world, it is common belief in the semantical counterpart K of H.
Step 3: We show now that if H is a SES, K satises A5: 8' 2 L;8 2 L,
^ml2M
 
Bi:ml _Bi:ml _Bi (ml  ! ') _Bi (ml  !  )
 ! Bi (' _  ) .
( !) Consider any (w;w) 2W . Suppose rst that
(H; (w;w)) j= ^ml2M
 
Bi:ml _Bi:ml _Bi (ml  ! ') _Bi (ml  !  )

.
The validation rules imply that for all ml 2M,
(H; (w;w)) j= Bi:ml _Bi:ml _Bi (ml  ! ') _Bi (ml  !  )
and therefore either:
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 (H; (w;w)) j= Bi:ml, which implies that, for all w0 2 Hi (w), (H; w0) j= :ml: since by
denition,
Hi (w;w) =
[
l0=0;1;::;L
 
(Hi (w) \Ml0)
 
H i (w) \M l0

,
for all (w0; w0) 2 Hi (w;w), (H; (w0; w0)) j= :ml, and thus (H; (w;w)) j= Bi:ml, which
also implies that (H; (w;w)) j= Bi (ml  ! (' _  )),
 or (H; (w;w)) j= Bi:ml, which implies that, for all w0 2 H i (w),
 H; w0 j= :ml, and thus
similarly to the preceeding case, (H; (w;w)) j= Bi (ml  ! (' _  )),
 or (H; (w;w)) j= Bi (ml  ! '), which implies that, for all w0 2 Hi (w), (H; w0) j=
(ml  ! '). Remark that the semantic rule implies that jml  ! 'j =
 jml  ! 'j W \
W  and therefore, for all (w0; w0) 2 Hi (w;w),Hi (w;w)  jml  ! 'j. Thus, (H; (w;w)) j=
Bi (ml  ! ') which in turn implies that (H; (w;w)) j= Bi (ml  ! (' _  )),
 or (H; (w;w)) j= Bi (ml  !  ), which implies that, for all w0 2 H i (w),
 H; w0 j=
(ml  !  ). Thus, similarly to the preceeding case, (H; (w;w)) j= Bi (ml  ! (' _  )).
Thus, for all ml 2 M, (H; (w;w)) j= Bi (ml  ! (' _  )),and therefore (H; (w;w)) j=
Bi (' _  ), which implies that
(H; (w;w)) j= ^ml2M
 
Bi:ml _Bi:ml _Bi (ml  ! ') _Bi (ml  !  )
  ! Bi (' _  ) .
(  ) Suppose now that (H; (w;w)) j= Bi (' _  ). Therefore, for all (w0; w0) 2 Hi (w;w),
(H; (w0; w0)) j= ' _  . Consider ml 2 M and let suppose that (H; (w;w)) 2
 
Bi:ml _Bi:ml

.
Then, the two sets A = Hi (w) \Ml and B = Hi (w) \M l are both non-empty. The semantic
rule implies that A  B = Hi (w;w) \
 
Ml M l

. (H; (w;w)) j= Bi (' _  ) implies that
AB  j' _  j. The semantic rule implies that
j' _  j = j'j [ j j =  j'j W  \W  [ hW  j j \W i .
So, A  B   j'j W  [ W  j j implies that A  j'j, and thus, for all w0 2 A,
(H; w0) j= ' or B  j j, and thus, for all w0 2 B,  H; w0 j=  . Hence, we have one of the two
conditions:
 for all (w0; w0) 2 Hi (w;w), either (H; w0) j= :ml or (H; w0) j= ', which implies that
(H; (w;w)) j= Bi (ml  ! '),
 for all (w0; w0) 2 Hi (w;w), either
 H; w0 j= :ml or  H; w0 j=  , which implies that
(H; (w;w)) j= Bi (ml  !  ).
Thus, we prove that if (H; (w;w)) 2
 
Bi:ml _Bi:ml

then (H; (w;w)) j= Bi (ml  ! ') _
Bi (ml  !  ). Hence,
(H; (w;w)) j= Bi (' _  )!
 
Bi:ml _Bi:ml _Bi (ml  ! ') _Bi (ml  !  )

.
On the whole, we have proved that
(H; (w;w)) j= ^ml2M
 
Bi:ml _Bi:ml _Bi (ml  ! ') _Bi (ml  !  )
 ! Bi (' _  ) .
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Since A5 holds in any world, this axiom is common belief in the semantical counterpart K
of H.
Step 4: Note nally that K is the syntactical counterpart of H. Actually, for all ' 2 L,
(H; (w;w)) j= ' i¤ (H; (w;w)) j= '. Since K = K\L, then K is the syntactical counterpart
of H.
(2) Suppose that K =
 K;K;K is a MSYS which satises A4 on one side, A5 on the other.
Suppose (ad absurdum) that H is not a SES. Then, there exists at least a world (w;w) 2 W 
and a player i 2 I such that Hi (w;w) = ;. Then, it follows that, for any l 2 L = f0; :::; Lg, if 
H i (w) \M l
 6= ;, then (Hi (w) \Ml) = ;. Since M l	l=0;:::;L and fMlgl=0;:::;L are respectively
partitions of W and W , this means that there exist two nonempty index subsets L0, L0  L,
such that L0 \L0 = ;, Hi (w) 
S
l2L0Ml and H i (w) 
S
l2L0M l. Let us note m = _l2L0ml. By
transcription, (H; w) j= Bi:m and
 H; w j= Bim. By connectedness of H, there exists a nite
sequence of players i1; :::; in and a nite sequence of worlds (w1; w1) ; :::; (wn; wn) such that in = i,
(w1; w1) = (w;w), (wn; wn) = (w;w) and, for all n   1  k  1, (wk+1; wk+1) 2 Hik (wk; wk).
Note that, for all n  1  k  1, wk+1 2 Hik (wk) and wk+1 2 H ik (wk).
We check rigorously the proof for the two simplest cases, that is when n = 1 and n = 2, and
more informally for n > 2.
When n = 1, we have (H;w) j= Bi:m and
 H;w j= Bim which means that Bi:m 2 K
and Bim 2 K, and thus Bi:m ^Bim 2 K which is a direct violation of A4.
When n = 2, there exists ml such that w 2Ml, w 2M l, and thus (H; w) j= ml ^Bi:ml and H; w j= ml ^Biml.
Therefore, (H;w) j= :Bi1:ml, (H;w) j= :Bi1: (ml ^Bi:ml),
 H;w j= :Bi1:ml and H;w j= :Bi1:  ml ^Biml. Thus
:Bi1:ml ^ :Bi1:ml ^ :Bi1: (ml ^Bi:ml) ^ :Bi1:
 
ml ^Biml
 2 K
which is equivalent to
:  Bi1:ml _Bi1:ml _Bi1 (ml  ! :Bi:ml) _Bi1  ml  ! :Biml 2 K
i.e.
:

Bi1:ml _Bi1:ml _Bi1 (ml  ! (:ml _ :Bi:ml))_
Bi1
 
ml  !
 :ml _ :Biml

2 K.
Since, for all l0 6= l, Bi1 (ml0  ! (:ml _ :Bi:ml)) 2 KandBi1
 
ml0  !
 :ml _ :Biml 2 K,
then
_
ml0
:

Bi1:ml0 _Bi1:ml0 _Bi1 (ml0  ! (:ml _ :Bi:ml))_
Bi1
 
ml0  !
 :ml _ :Biml

2 K
and A5 implies that :Bi1
 
(:ml _ :Bi:ml) _
 :ml _ :Biml 2 K which is equivalent to
:Bi1:
 
ml ^Bi:ml ^Biml
 2 K. Otherwise, by A4, Bi1:  Bi:ml ^Biml 2 K. Besides,
since :  Bi:ml ^Biml! :  ml ^Bi:ml ^Biml is a tautology, then
Bi1
 :  Bi:ml ^Biml! :  ml ^Bi:ml ^Biml 2 K.
Finally, by A2, we get: Bi1:
 
ml ^Bi:ml ^Biml
 2 K which is a contradiction.
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For n > 2, there exists a sequence l1; :::; ln 1 2 L such that
(H;w) j= :Bi1:
 
ml1 ^ :Bi2:(:::: ^ :Bin 1:
 
mln 1 ^Bi:m

)
and  H;w j= :Bi1:  ml1 ^ :Bi2:(:::: ^ :Bin 1:  mln 1 ^Bim).
Similarly, according to A5, we can prove rst that
:Bi1:

ml1 ^ :Bi2:(:::: ^ :Bin 1:
 
mln 1 ^Bi:m

)^
:Bi2:(:::: ^ :Bin 1:
 
mln 1 ^Bim

)

2 K
then that
:Bi1:

ml1 ^ :Bi2:(ml2 ^ :Bi3:(:::::Bin 1:
 
mln 1 ^Bi:m

)^
:Bi3:(:::: ^ :Bin 1:
 
mln 1 ^Bim

))

2 K
until that :Bi1:

ml1 ^ :Bi2:(:::: ^ :Bin 1:
 
mln 1 ^Bi:m ^Bim

)

2 K which can be
rewritten as:
:Bi1

:ml1 _Bi2(:::: _Bin 1:
 
mln 1 ^Bi:m ^Bim

)

2 K.
Otherwise, by A4, Bi1 :::B

in 1:
 
Bi:m ^Bim
 2 K. By using the rule of classical logic and
A2, we can successively prove that
Bi1 :::B

in 1:
 
mln 1 ^Bi:m ^Bim
 2 K,
Bi1 :::B

in 2

:mln 2 _Bin 1:
 
mln 1 ^Bi:m ^Bim
 2 K,
until Bi1

:ml1 _Bi2(:::: _Bin 2

:mln 2 _Bin 1:
 
mln 1 ^Bi:m ^Bim
 2 K which
yields a contradiction. Since H is a SES, as proved just above, we can construct a semantic
structure H as in the proof of (1). The syntactical counterpart of H is a MSYS K0=

K0;K0;K0

such that
 K0 = K since K0 and K are the syntactical counterpart of H,
 K0 = K since K0 and K are the syntactical counterpart of H,
 K0 is the syntactical counterpart of H,
 K0 satises A4 and A5.
By Theorem 1, K0 = K, and thus K is the syntactical counterpart of H.
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